Africa2036

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Mali

4 objects, each built so its context cannot be cropped away. Every one states the scenario range rather than a single value, carries the confidence level and the date the evidence was last checked, and links back to the full page it came from.

Copy a card's link to share it. Screenshot one and the qualifications come with it, because they are inside the frame rather than under it.

Country outlook · Western Africa

Mali

Three scenarios, two horizons. The range is the finding — a single number would imply knowledge nobody has.

MeasureLatest observed20312036
Output per person $1,193 2025 $1,127 – $1,414$1,074 – $1,629
Electricity access 50% 2024 55% – 62%59% – 69%
Internet use 37% 2024 47% – 58%53% – 68%

Growth bands: -0.95% · 0.96% · 2.87% a year per person, from Mali's own 15-year record (2011–2025) — mean ± 0.85 standard deviations, clamped to its own 5th–95th percentile. Not an outside estimate of what this country might do.

Who this outlook leaves out
  • A cohort that reaches working age faster than jobs, training places or clinics are built
  • Rain-fed farming households, first and hardest, in a bad season
  • A state that must regulate technologies it has too few trained people to assess
Considered evidence Initial country review Data to 2025 Evidence checked 2026-07-25 Built 2026-07-31

Scenarios are not predictions. Every figure is arithmetic on Mali's own observed history under a published assumption.

Full evidence, sources and gaps for Mali →

Africa 2036 Intelligence · An initiative by Orvantis Intelligence · Created and directed by Hannah Kwakye

2031 versus 2036 · Mali

Two horizons, asked the same question

By 2031
  • Household electricity access moves from 49.5% of the population (2024) to between 55% and 62% by 2031, depending on the scenario. Simple continuation gives 58% — a rise of 8.5 percentage points.
  • In people rather than percentages: about 12.5 million would still be without it in 2031 under continuation — 207,499 fewer than in 2024, because the population grows as the share improves.
  • Internet use moves from 36.8% of the population (2024) to between 47% and 58% by 2031, depending on the scenario. Simple continuation gives 52% — a rise of 14.8 percentage points.
  • In people rather than percentages: about 14.4 million would still be without it in 2031 under continuation — 1.5 million fewer than in 2024, because the population grows as the share improves.
  • Output per person spans $1,127 to $1,414 by 2031. The $287 between them is under a quarter of today's $1,193.
  • That spread is the distance between scenarios, not a margin of error — and it is a national average, which does not identify whose income moved.
  • The population reaches about 29.8 million — roughly 4.6 million more people than in 2025, about 16.1 million of them of working age.
  • This figure is the same in all three scenarios. Most of the people who will be alive in 2031 have already been born.
By 2036
  • Household electricity access moves from 49.5% of the population (2024) to between 59% and 69% by 2036, depending on the scenario. Simple continuation gives 63% — a rise of 13.7 percentage points.
  • In people rather than percentages: about 12.5 million would still be without it in 2036 under continuation — 225,221 fewer than in 2024, because the population grows as the share improves.
  • Internet use moves from 36.8% of the population (2024) to between 53% and 68% by 2036, depending on the scenario. Simple continuation gives 60% — a rise of 23.2 percentage points.
  • In people rather than percentages: about 13.6 million would still be without it in 2036 under continuation — 2.3 million fewer than in 2024, because the population grows as the share improves.
  • Output per person spans $1,074 to $1,629 by 2036. The $555 between them is a quarter to a half of today's $1,193.
  • That spread is the distance between scenarios, not a margin of error — and it is a national average, which does not identify whose income moved.
  • The population reaches about 34 million — roughly 8.8 million more people than in 2025, about 18.8 million of them of working age.
  • This figure is the same in all three scenarios. Most of the people who will be alive in 2036 have already been born.
What has to happen first
  • For the Acceleration band to describe the decade, growth per person has to hold near 2.9% a year. This country has reached that rate before — its best year in the window was 3.3% — but has not sustained it across the 15-year record the band is drawn from.
Considered evidence Initial country review Data to 2025 Evidence checked 2026-07-25 Built 2026-07-31

Scenarios are not predictions. Every figure is arithmetic on Mali's own observed history under a published assumption.

Full evidence, sources and gaps for Mali →

Africa 2036 Intelligence · An initiative by Orvantis Intelligence · Created and directed by Hannah Kwakye

What the growth model cannot see · Mali

Political instability & conflict

Binding constraint — This, not the growth model, is the operative question.

Political stability scored -2.5 in 2024, in the lowest band of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, with 409,000 people internally displaced (2025). The distance between scenarios here is set by whether the security situation holds, not by economic policy. The modelled band, drawn from recent economic history, does not describe what further deterioration would mean.

Why the band cannot contain it

Conflict does not appear in a trailing growth average until after it has already happened. A country at peace for fifteen years has no war in its variance.

What would invalidate the modelled band

Onset or escalation of armed conflict. The modelled band is drawn from economic history and contains no war; if this occurs, disregard the quantitative path entirely.

Assessed in words and deliberately not converted into a probability. This platform does not publish likelihoods it cannot derive from evidence.

Considered evidence Initial country review Data to 2025 Evidence checked 2026-07-25 Built 2026-07-31

Scenarios are not predictions. Every figure is arithmetic on Mali's own observed history under a published assumption.

Full evidence, sources and gaps for Mali →

Africa 2036 Intelligence · An initiative by Orvantis Intelligence · Created and directed by Hannah Kwakye

AI evidence state · Mali

5 of 20 dimensions rest on a document or a measurement

3 dimensions have not been examined at all — which is a statement about this platform's research, not about Mali. There is no readiness score here: ranking countries by a weighted sum of twenty evidence states would manufacture a number nobody measured.

4 Measured A published measurement exists for this country and has been read.
1 Documented A policy, law, contract or programme document exists. No measurement of its effect has been found.
5 Inferred Assessed from adjacent indicators. Nothing AI-specific was found for this country; the reading is circumstantial.
7 Not evident Searched, and nothing was found. Informative — but the absence of a published record is not proof that nothing exists.
3 Unexamined This platform has not looked. This is a statement about the research, not about the country.
Considered evidence Initial country review Data to 2025 Evidence checked 2026-07-25 Built 2026-07-31

Scenarios are not predictions. Every figure is arithmetic on Mali's own observed history under a published assumption.

Full evidence, sources and gaps for Mali →

Africa 2036 Intelligence · An initiative by Orvantis Intelligence · Created and directed by Hannah Kwakye

Full brief for Mali · Open in the atlas · Method · How to read the labels